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Reliability has been highlighted by NASA as critical to future human space exploration 
particularly in the area of environmental controls and life support systems.  The Advanced 
Exploration Systems (AES) projects have been encouraged to pursue higher reliability 
components and systems as part of technology development plans. However, there is no 
consensus on what is meant by improving on reliability; nor on how to assess reliability 
within the AES projects.  This became apparent when trying to assess reliability as one of 
several figures of merit for a regenerable water architecture trade study.  In the Spring of 
2013, the AES Water Recovery Project (WRP) hosted a series of events at the NASA 
Johnson Space Center (JSC) with the intended goal of establishing a common language and 
understanding of our reliability goals and equipping the projects with acceptable means of 
assessing our respective systems.  This campaign included an educational series in which 
experts from across the agency and academia provided information on terminology, tools 
and techniques associated with evalauating and designing for system reliability.  The 
campaign culminated in a workshop at JSC with members of the ECLSS and AES 
communities with the goal of developing a consensus on what reliability means to AES and 
identifying methods for assessing our low to mid-technology readiness level (TRL) 
technologies for reliability.  This paper details the results of the workshop. 
Nomenclature 
AES = Advanced Exploration Systems 
WRP = Water Recovery Project 
ECLSS = Environmental Control and Life Support Systems 
RAM = Reliability, Availability, Maintainability 
FOM =   Figure of Merit 
TRL =   Technology Readiness Level 
WRS = Water Recovery System 
ELC = Embedded Learning Consultant 
RAM = Reliability, Availability, Maintainability 
SME = Subject Matter Expert 
TIM = Technical Interchange Meeting 
PRA = Probabalistic Risk Assessment 
FMEA = Failure Modes  & Effects Analysis 
RBD = Reliability Block Diagram 
MTBF = Mean Time Before Failure 
EMAT = Exploration Maintainability Analysis Tool 
I. Introduction 
S part of NASA's Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) program, the AES Water Recovery Project is 
pioneering new approaches for rapidly developing and testing prototype systems in an effort to increase the 
reliability of water recycling for deep space human exploration missions.1  Per the NASA Strategic Space 
Technology Investment Plan, “Reliability, logistics, and loop closure of spacecraft environmental controls and life 
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support systems (ECLSS) all contribute to overall mission lifecycle costs and opportunities; the more reliable and 
resource-efficient an ECLSS is, the farther a mission can safely travel from Earth (and from the option of resupply) 
and the less mass will have to launch, saving significant costs.”2 
In keeping with this charter, reliability was intended to be a key figure of merit (FOM) in an effort to establish a 
reference architecture for AES Water Recovery System (WRS) which would serve to guide future technical 
planning, establish a baseline development roadmap for technology infusion, and establish baseline assumptions for 
integrated ground and on-orbit life support systems definition.3  The reliability FOM was initially based on 
qualitative assessment of each system for reliability indicators such as number of moving parts and number of 
uniquely controlled elements.  This FOM was not accepted by the project stakeholders; nor was an alternative FOM 
supplied. Upon further evaluation, two challenges to acquiring a reliability FOM became apparent:  
1. The AES WRP Stakeholders held different understandings of “reliability.” 
2. There was insufficient data on the low to mid-technology readiness level (TRL) technologies being 
developed by WRP to support traditional reliability analysis. 
To address these challenges, the AES Water Recovery Project initiated an effort to educate itself and the entire 
AES project community on concepts and available tools/methodologies associated with reliaiblity.  A key to this 
approach was the inclusion of a highly experienced training and development professional, from the NASA Johnson 
Space Center Human Resources Development Office, who served as an embedded learning consultant (ELC) and 
was a key member of the project team.  The learning solution design and proceedings are offered in this report. 
1. Develop consensus on a common definition of “reliability” amongst AES projects. 
2. Develop a consensus on how AES projects will assess reliability.  
3. Identify the information that must be known about a system in order to effectively assess its reliability.   
 
II. Learning Solution Design and Development 
To meet these objectives, it was critical that AES project leadership gain a fundamental understanding of 
reliability concepts, methodologies, and available tools.  To accomplish this, the ELC and WRP Systems 
Engineering and Integration Lead designed a curriculum that covered selected competencies from NASA’s 
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) competency model.  The design of this curriculum consisted of 
an educational series of five short courses that were 2 hours in length each and offered in-person and virtually to 
AES and ECLSS community members.  The ELC identified subject matter experts (SME) for each of the five 
courses and worked with the SME to design training that targeted the aforementioned competencies and objectives.  
This educational series concluded with an “AES Reliability Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM)” where all 
members of AES and ECLSS communities were invited to participate.  The goal of the TIM was to gain a consensus 
on a common reliability definition and to identify methods for assessing reliability of mid-readiness level 
technologies. 
III. Proceedings 
A. Evaluating Systems for Reliability - An S&MA Perspective 
This course, lead by members of the NASA Johnson Space Center Safety and Mission Assurance organization, 
provided an overarching perspective of “reliability” and assessment tools.  To start the course, it was highlighted 
that what most consider reliability is really a three-faceted concept known as RAM (Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability).  The definitions for each element of RAM were given as follows: 
• Reliability – the ability of a system to perform its intended function. 
• Availability – a characteristic of repairable or restorable items or systems, assumes that a failed item can be 
restored to operation through maintenance, reconfiguration, or reset. 
• Maintainability – the ability to maintain or restore a system function within specified time and effort. 
This course included a description and application of tools such as Probability Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure 
Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA), Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD), and Fault Trees.  A key takeaway from this 
course included a realization that PRA may not be the most appropriate tool for assessing reliability in low to mid-
readiness level systems that have little reliability data available, and RBD may be useful for faster/low fidelity 
assessment of architecture reliability. 
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B. Accelerated Reliability Testing 
Darwin Poritz, a statistician in the JSC Crew and Thermal Systems Division, was invited to lead a discussion on 
accelerated life testing.  The objective of this course was to explain the principles that underlie accelerated life 
testing and to present the rationale for accelerated life testing at NASA.  Two examples of accelerated life testing at 
NASA were presented.  The principles behind accelerated testing are based on the work of the Swedish chemist 
Svante Arrhenius (1859 - 1927).  Life testing is based on the principle that most reactions require an activation 
energy, an energy barrier that must be overcome before two molecules will react.  The idea of accelerated testing is 
that the more energy that is applied to a system, the more the system ages.  
Life testing involves testing a component or system to a key event.  A key event is defined by the investigator.  
This could be a specific kind of failure, any failure, end of useful life, some level of degradation in performance, etc.  
Accelerated life testing is based on the principle that energy "ages" things and that a particular change occurs at the 
activation energy; applying more intense energy will cause the system to reach its activation energy in a shorter 
amount of calendar time.  An example would be to cycle a system at a faster rate than would be experienced during 
operation (e.g. cycle 1000 times over two weeks instead of the 10 years these cycles would normally accumulate.)  
Long-term reliability will be very important for deep space missions.  Accelerated testing may be the only way of 
simulating long-term stresses over a reasonable time for equipment development and testing on the ground.  
Reliability testing of multiple items on the ground will likely reduce the number of spares that need to be launched.  
The idea is to manufacture and to test more units on the ground in order to achieve higher reliability of the units that 
are launched.  Life testing is more common in industries where parts are numerous and inexpensive, and can 
therefore be tested to failure.  Given this, life testing on space systems is a challenge since many systems or system 
components are unique and are available in very small quantities. 
C. Langley Exploration Maintainability Analysis Tool (EMAT) Demo  
Representatives from NASA Langley Research Center (LRC) were invited to introduce the concept of 
supportability and to view a demonstration of a tool (EMAT) with modeling and simulation capabilities to assess 
supportability issues for deep space vehicles.  Supportability refers to the inherent characteristics of design and 
operations that enable the effective and efficient maintenance and support of the spacecraft throughout the mission.  
Supportability involves a number of design issues, including reliability, reparability, redundancy, sparing, and 
maintainability.  Proposed NASA missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) will introduce substantial new 
challenges in the area of supportability and maintainability: 
• Limited or no logistics chain back to Earth. 
• No quick abort path back to Earth - increases the criticality of spacecraft systems and increases the demands 
on overall spacecraft reliability. 
• High sensitivity of transportation elements to increased logistics mass - very high ‘gear ratio.’ 
• Exposure to radiation environment - more difficult to estimate the failure rates of systems and components. 
 
Because of these challenges, there is a huge level of uncertainty in how to design and operate spacecraft for deep 
space missions.  This includes uncertainty in the amount of maintenance and spares that must be manifested on the 
mission in order to ensure the safety of the crew and the reliability of the mission.  There is little or no re-supply 
during these missions, and there are a large number of critical components and systems.  Other design considerations 
include the ease of access to critical systems and components, volume allocations for spares, consumables, and 
tools, and time requirements on the crew to maintain and repair systems.  The amount of mass and volume that must 
be committed to spares and maintenance items in order to assure a safe and effective mission could be a first order 
driver in spacecraft and mission design.  There is a perception that improved reliability could alone solve the 
supportability challenges.  While improved reliability should directly reduce required crew time for repair and 
maintenance mass, improved reliability likely will not directly reduce required spares mass.  Manifesting of spares is 
intended to protect against possible failures not simply expected failures.  Reliability is not the only strategy for 
solving the supportability challenges on beyond LEO missions.  Strategies for improving supportability include: 
• Reliability:  Increase the predicted Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF) for critical components and systems. 
• Lower Level of Repair:  Provide opportunity and capability for the crew to repair failed equipment at lower 
levels, replacing only the failed element rather than the entire unit. 
• Redundancy:  As an alternative to repair, provide for backup or degradable capabilities.  
• Commonality:  Design systems to utilize similar units or repair items. 
• Cannibalization and Asset Reallocation:  Scavenge parts from expired modules prior to jettison or discard to 
build up spares stock. 
• In-Space Manufacturing:  Provide capabilities to manufacture replacement parts or tools 
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• Repair During Assembly:  Provide for a ConOps that allows all system failures to be repaired and spares 
stocks replenished immediately prior to departure to the exploration destination 
 
Because it may be a first-order driver in design, it is critical to have a capability to evaluate maintainability for 
beyond-LEO missions.  Because of the new environment and lack of historical data, NASA had no effective 
capability to evaluate sparing requirements and spacecraft reliability (including repair activities) for beyond-LEO 
missions.  NASA initiated a project to develop modeling & simulation capabilities to assess supportability issues for 
deep space vehicles.  The desired capabilities included: 
• Estimate mass/volume of spares and maintenance items 
• Predict spacecraft reliability/safety 
• Estimate crew time requirements 
• Evaluate impacts of system design 
• Evaluate effectiveness of strategies to reduce mass/volume requirements and improve reliability 
• Ability to trade mass/volume, time, design, and reliability 
The initial goal is not necessarily to make absolute estimates of reliability or mass, but rather to explore the 
design factors that will impact maintainability.  A joint NASA/Binera/Georgia Tech University team is currently 
developing a model to support mission and architecture analysis that investigates supportability for beyond LEO 
missions.  Using a tool called the “Exploration Maintainability Analysis Tool” (EMAT), the modeler is able to 
perform a dynamic simulation that functions as a “virtual spacecraft”: 
• Spacecraft systems, components, and operations are modeled using logical relationships.  
• Simulation employs a Monte Carlo approach to simulate representative missions with stochastic failures. 
• Simulates failures and repairs for a candidate exploration mission. 
• Simulates maintenance, failures, and repair actions on key systems in the elements that make up a deep 
space vehicle. 
• Tracks the actions and materials required to maintain and repair the systems.  
• Evaluates the overall reliability of the systems based on the supportability. 
D. Statistical Analysis for Assessing Reliability  
Mark Powell, a consultant with specialization in systems engineering and risk assessment, lead the next seminar.  
He focused the discussion on dealing with engineering specialties associated with the “-ilities”; i.e. requirements that 
define design aspects with the “-ility” suffix such as probability, reliability, availaibility, etc.  He proposed that all “-
ilities” address uncertain performance and have the following common key characteristics: 
• states a required probability of performance (by definition) 
• establishes a maximum acceptable risk 
• covers a specified period of performance 
From this perspective, the following definitions were provided to supplement those provided by the S&MA 
organization (defined in Section III. A. herein): 
• Reliability: probability that item will survive (not fail before) to a specified service life 
• Availability: the probability that the item will be in a condition and state ready to perform intended function 
when called upon during a specific service life 
• Maintainability: probability item can be repaired in some period of time 
• Logistics: probability that a part needed to repair can be provided within some period of time 
• Safety: probability that no harm or injury will occur within some period of time 
• Quality: probability that part meets requirements  
Mr. Powell proceeded to lead a discussion on the difficulties of dealing with “-ility” requirements while 
engineering systems. He presented several challenges including: complexity and non-inituitive nature of probability 
and statistics theory, the interrelated nature of the -ilities, complexity associated with decomposition and allocation 
of probability and performance to base elements in complex systems, and verification which requires a significant 
amount of testing and analysis to acquire a “probability that a probability was satisfied by the as-built.”4 During this 
conversation it was highlighted that a human element in responding to probabilistic assessments; decision analysis 
involves not only the probably of an event occurring but the value we place on the possible outcomes.   
Mr. Powell then provided some basic advice for dealing with engineering specialties and provided an overview 
of some advancements in probabilistic risk assessment.  Of particular interest was the use of objective models of 
uncertainty in pre-posterior distributions through the use of Markov Chain Monte Carlo method. What is appealing 
about this method is its applicability to systems that lack data because they have not yet been built; typical of system 
being developed by AES. 
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provided the AES and ECLSS community with a common lexicon with which to communicate; instead of defining 
“reliability”, additional terms associated with the attributes the collective community associates with reliability were 
provided: reliability, availability, maintainability, sustainability, etc.  Additionally, various tools were defined that 
would aid in evaluating systems for reliability and their applicability with respect to complexity and maturity of the 
technology.  Many systems being developed within AES would benefit from analysis tools that do not require 
detailed systems definition or a significant amount of test data such as Reliability Block Diagrams.  Additionally, 
when evaluating mission architectures one might considering using the Rapid Response Risk Assessment Tool 
and/or  EMAT developed by JSC S&MA organization and LRC respectively.    
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